Short answer
Trust claims must specify which build is being discussed. The privacy build is generated separately and audited for known third-party runtime references.
Build boundary
Verification path
Use the verification page, browser DevTools, and repository privacy tests to inspect the behavior instead of relying on marketing language.
Every third-party resource, in one table
Vendored in the privacy build (served same-origin from /vendor/):
Name Version Public-site host Purpose Privacy build
JSZip 3.10.1 cdnjs.cloudflare.com ZIP creation for batch output /vendor/jszip-3.10.1.min.js
pdf-lib 1.17.1 unpkg.com PDF merge/split/compress /vendor/pdf-lib-1.17.1.min.js
jsPDF 2.5.1 cdnjs.cloudflare.com Images-to-PDF generation /vendor/jspdf-2.5.1.umd.min.js
PDF.js 3.4.120 cdnjs.cloudflare.com PDF rendering (+ worker) /vendor/pdfjs-3.4.120.min.js
heic2any 0.0.4 cdn.jsdelivr.net HEIC decode/convert /vendor/heic2any-0.0.4.min.js
Removed entirely from the privacy build (no vendored equivalent):
Name Purpose Public-site host Privacy build
Google Tag Manager Container GTM-KQHC5ZGV www.googletagmanager.com removed
AdSense (ads.txt pub-2823470980745945) Ad serving pagead2.googlesyndication.com removed
Google Fonts (Inter, JetBr.) Webfont delivery fonts.googleapis.com/gstatic.com removed, no vendored font
@imgly/background-removal AI Deep Cutout inference + model cdn.jsdelivr.net disabled, throws an explicit error
Cloudflare Web Analytics Performance telemetry beacon Cloudflare-injected beacon script (see docs/DEPLOYMENT_PRIVACY.md) must stay disabled at host level
Why the audit skips vendor/
scripts/audit-privacy-build.js walks the generated artifact looking for disallowed hostnames and phrases, but it explicitly skips the vendor/ directory while doing so. The five vendored libraries are third-party code themselves, and their own minified source or embedded license comments can legitimately contain strings like a CDN hostname from where the library was originally published, which would otherwise trigger a false positive unrelated to what the site actually requests at runtime.
This means the audit's guarantee is about what the generated HTML, CSS, and top-level JavaScript reference and request, not a claim that the vendored files contain no historical reference to their origin. The version pinning and file inventory in THIRD_PARTIES.md is what ties each vendored file back to a specific, reviewable upstream release.
Font fallback in the privacy build
The site's CSS defines its font stack as Inter first, followed by system-ui, -apple-system, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, and sans-serif. Because the privacy build removes the Google Fonts link and the CSP sets font-src 'self' with no vendored font file, Inter does not load there; the browser renders the next available font in that same stack instead. This is a visible side effect of the no-remote-fonts policy, not a separate font substitution step.
FAQ
Does the privacy build load Google Tag Manager?
No. GTM is stripped from the privacy build.
Does the privacy build load Cloudflare Web Analytics?
It should not. If a beacon appears in rendered HTML, that is a Cloudflare dashboard configuration problem that must be disabled.
Are vendored libraries third-party code?
They are third-party libraries served from the same origin and tracked in the repository inventory, each pinned to the version listed in the table above.
Why does the privacy build look like it uses a different font?
Because Google Fonts is removed and no font is vendored locally, the browser falls back to the next font in the site's own CSS stack rather than loading Inter remotely.
Is the AI Deep Cutout model file vendored like the other libraries?
No. It is disabled outright in the privacy build rather than being downloaded and served same-origin, because of its size and because it is fetched at runtime rather than bundled with the page.
Where do these version numbers come from?
THIRD_PARTIES.md and the CDN-to-vendor mapping inside scripts/build-privacy.js, cross-checked against the actual script tags in the public HTML.
Review note
Trust documentation reviewed: May 2026. These pages describe the current public and privacy-build architecture and should be updated when deployment, telemetry, or runtime dependencies change.